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indictment on or about October 24, 2007, and has been in continuous custody since his first 1 2 appearance in this case.¹ This motion is made on the grounds that SILVA is not a danger to the community or 3 himself, that he is not a flight risk, and that his continued detention violates due process of law. 4 This motion will be based on this notice of motion, declaration of counsel, the attached 5 memorandum of points and authorities, the papers, records, and files in this action, and on such 6 7 oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing. 8 Dated: April 2, 2008 9 Respectfully submitted, 10 11 GEORGE C. BOISSEAU 12 Attorney for Defendant MICHÁEL JOSEPH SILVA 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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SILVA was originally arrested by local authorities for transportation and possession for sale of heroin on May 10, 2007. He remained in state custody until the state charges were dismissed. He was thereupon rearrested upon the filing of the Indictment. Thus, he has been in custody for the same conduct since May 10, 2007, a period of almost a year.

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It is primarily SILVA's criminal record, his poor record on parole and probation, and the recency of the offense conduct in the pending indictment, which supports the court's finding that SILVA is a danger to the community, a flight risk, and that no condition of release could reasonably assure community safety and SILVA's appearance in court. SILVA's conviction record begins in 1982. Admittedly, he has several failure to appears, probation violations and parole violations during the last twenty-five years.

However, SILVA's criminal history (and failure on probation and parole) stems primary from his long-term addiction to heroin. SILVA's drug history is well documented and known to Pre-Trial Services.

SILVA's parents, Eddie and Esperanza Silva, are now willing to pledge their home to secure SILVA's release. They reside at 2000 103rd Avenue, Oakland, California 94603 and have a substantial amount of equity in their home.

SILVA, if released pretrial, will reside with his wife, Delores Silva, and their 16 year old son, Edward Silva. Mrs. Silva resides at 7682 Redbud Court, Newark, California 94560 with her parents. She is seriously ill and recently had brain surgery to repair an aneurysm.² She needs SILVA's help and support during her recovery.

SILVA is willing to abide by all terms and conditions of release which this Court may deem necessary. Electronic monitoring will reasonably assure community safety and court appearances. He will agree to narcotics testing and out-patient drug-abuse treatment as a condition of his release.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On October 11, 2008 an indictment was filed against SILVA charging him with conspiracy to distributed heroin and one count of possession of heroin with the intent to

² Dr. Robert Richardson performed brain surgery on Mrs. Silva on January 10, 2008. She is recuperating from that surgery and will have to undergo another procedure in May, 2008.

distribute. He is charged with sixteen other named defendants. The conspiracy count charges that the conspiracy began on December 1, 2005 and continued to October 11, 2007. During this time, the defendants allegedly conspired to distribute one (1) kilogram of heroin.

Count 10 of the Indictment charges SILVA, Jose Juan Penaloza-Hilario and Eleazar Mora-Arciga with possessing heroin with the intent to distribute on May 10, 2007. This count involves three ounces of black tar heroin.

COMMUNITY TIES

SILVA has substantial ties to the community and considerable community support, which all has been previously brought to this Court's attention at the original detention hearing and by the Pre-Trial Services report submitted in this case. He has resided in Oakland virtually his entire life. All his family reside in the east bay and his parents are willing to post their family residence to secure SILVA's release. Other family members are also willing to co-sign any personal surety bond set by this Court.

In order to address this Court's concern about "danger to the community", SILVA is willing to agree to 24-hour monitoring and "house arrest" at his parents-in-law's residence during the period of pre-trial release. He agrees not to use the telephone, not associate with anyone other than his immediate family, and abide by the strictest of conditions of release. His wife agrees to act as custodian and will restrict access of others to the residence.

PRETRIAL DETENTION TO DATE

SILVA has been in custody since May 10, 2008. The undersigned counsel entered an appearance on October 24, 2007 and no pre-trial hearing or trial dates have been set.

ARGUMENT

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SILVA IS NOT A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY AND THERE ARE CONDITIONS OF RELEASE THAT COULD REASONABLY ASSURE

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COMMUNITY SAFETY AND HIS PRESENCE IN COURT.

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A. <u>New Information Regarding Danger to the Community:</u>

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on any bond that is set and his wife is having serious medical problems. Mrs. Delores Silva needs her husband's help during her recovery. If SILVA is released, he will care for his wife on

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a full-time basis.

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B. <u>Applicable Principles</u>:

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Title 18 U.S.C. §3142(a) governs the release of criminal defendants pending trial.

Since the last appearance before this Court, SILVA's parents have agreed to be sureties

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Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial, the person--(1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an

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unsecured appearance bond, under subsection (b) of this section; (2) released on a condition or combination of conditions under subsection (c) of this section; (3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release,

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deportation, or exclusion under subsection (d) of this section; or (4) detained under subsection (e) of this section.

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18 U.S.C. §3142(a).

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money bonds and to provide flexible alternatives to judges in setting bail. See generally United

The primary purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was to de-emphasize the use of

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States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir.1985)(en banc). Title 18U.S.C. §3142(b) expressly

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provides that a criminal defendant shall be released on personal recognizance (PR), or upon his

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or her own recognizance (OR), unless the defendant represents either a flight risk or a danger to

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the community. However, this Court cannot detain someone merely if it determines that OR or PR will not prevent flight or ensure community safety. The Court must nonetheless consider

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other conditions. 18 U.S.C. §§3142(a) and (c); see also Orta, 760 F.2d at 890. Indeed, 18 U.S.C.

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§3142(c) provides that if the judicial officer determines that OR or PR is not sufficient, the

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"judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person...subject to the least restrictive

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further condition or combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will

reasonably assure the ...safety of any other person and the community...." (Emphasis supplied). The structure of the statute mandates every form of release be considered before detention may be imposed. <u>United States v. Orta, supra, 760 F.2d at 892.</u>

Federal law has traditionally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail. <u>United States v. Motamedi</u>, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir.1985)(explaining that "the Fifth and Eighth Amendments's prohibitions of deprivation of liberty without due process and of excessive bail require careful review of pretrial detention orders to ensure that the statutory mandate has been respected)[citing <u>Stack v. Boyle</u>, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)]. Only in rare cases should release be denied. <u>Motamedi, supra</u>, 767 F.2d at 1405 [citing <u>Sellers v. United States</u>, 89 S.Ct. 36, 38 (1968)]; see also <u>United States v. Hir</u>, __F.3d __ , 2008 U.S.App. Lexis 3245 (9th Cir.2008). And doubts regarding the propriety of release are to be resolved in favor of defendants. <u>Id</u>. at 1405 [citing <u>Herzog v. United States</u>, 75 S.Ct. 349, 351 (1955)]; see also <u>United States v. Townsend</u>, 897 F.2d 989, 993 (9th Cir.1990).³

 Section 3142(g) details the factors that may be considered at a detention hearing. These factors include the person's character, family ties, employment, criminal history, the nature and seriousness of the offense charged, the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release, as well as the weight of the evidence against the defendant. The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that the weight of the evidence against the defendant is the least important factor because a court cannot make a pretrial determination of guilt. <u>United States v. Motamedi, supra,</u> 767 F.2d at 1408; see also <u>United States v. Gebro</u>, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.1991); <u>United States v. Winsor</u>, 785 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir.1986)(evidence of guilt relevant only in terms of the likelihood that the person will fail to appear or will pose a danger to the community).

C. SILVA Is Not A Flight Risk:

SILVA is not a flight risk. He has substantial ties to Oakland.⁴ He has no ties to Mexico or any other country. Nor does SILVA have any history of travel outside the Bay area.

D. SILVA Is Not A Danger to the Community:

Conditions of release can be imposed which reasonably assure that SILVA not be a danger to the community. Home detention, along with around-the-clock monitoring, and search conditions would reasonably assure that SILVA not be involved in any narcotics trafficking. All of SILVA's activities would be monitored by Pretrial Services.⁵

Also, the fact that SILVA has not been involved in any acts of violence is significant. SILVA does not have a history of any weapons use, assaults, or threats of violence against others. Even his prior criminal record for narcotics possession and theft is not indicative of large-scale illegal activity. The prior narcotics offenses involved small quantities of narcotics consistent with a user of heroin and other narcotics. He has never before been involved in a conspiracy to distributed narcotics.

SILVA has suffered various violations of probation and parole over the years. His supervisory history in the past has not been good. However, the seriousness of the instant charges and his family support have had a substantial impact upon SILVA. He will under no circumstances cause his parents to lose their house by either violating his conditions of release or

[&]quot;Community" embraces both the community in which the charges are brought and also a community in the United States to which the defendant has ties. <u>United States v. Townsend, supra, 897 F.2d at 995; United States v. Hir, supra, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis at 11; see also <u>Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978); United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 162 (3rd Cir.1986)(reversing order of pretrial detention because of defendant's "family ties to the area").</u></u>

A condition of electronic monitoring and no association with others who may be involved in narcotics trafficking may be imposed. See 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(B)(v). Home detention and electronic monitoring will give reasonable assurances that SILVA not associate with <u>anyone</u> except his immediate family. Only his wife, son and parents-in-law currently live at the residence at 7582 Redbud Court, Newark, California.

failing to appear. He is grateful that his family is firmly behind him despite the seriousness of the charges.

The presumption that "no condition nor combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community" [18 U.S.C. §3142(e)] has been rebutted in this case. SILVA has substantial ties to the community. A combination of home detention, search conditions, and electronic monitoring would ensure his appearance in court and that he not engage in any future narcotics trafficking. His strong family support will insure that he not be a danger to the community in that his family members will vigilantly monitor his activities.

THE PRETRIAL DETENTION OF SILVA IS UNDULY PROLONGED AND VIOLATES DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II.

To date, SILVA has been detained for almost a year.

Trial is at least several months away. There are numerous pretrial motions which need to be filed.

A. <u>Applicable Principles</u>:

The Due Process Clause states "[n]o person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The constitutional ban on excessive pretrial detention is a right guaranteed by substantive due process. Substantive due process protects "personal immunities which...are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." <u>Rochin v. California</u>, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).

Detention determinations must be made individually and, in the final analysis, must be based on the evidence which is before the court regarding the particular defendant. See <u>United States v. Tortora</u>, 922 F.2d 880, 888 (1st Cir.1990)("Undoubtedly, the safety of the community can be reasonably assured without being absolutely guaranteed...Requiring that release conditions guarantee the community's safety would fly in the teeth of Congress's clear intent that only a limited number of defendants be subject to pretrial detention.").

The enumerated fundamental rights that are implicated by SILVA's assertion of (continued...)

The length of pretrial detention raises the constitutional issue of due process. <u>United States v. Salerno</u>, 481 U.S. 739, 747 n.4 (1987); see also <u>United States v. Millan</u>, 4 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2nd Cir.1993); <u>United States v. Orena</u>, 986 F.2d 628, 630-631 (2nd Cir.1993); <u>United States v. Portes</u>, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir.1986); <u>United States v. Accetturo</u>, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3rd Cir.1986); <u>United States v. Gonzales-Claudio</u>, 806 F.2d 1510, 1516 (2nd Cir.1986); <u>United States v. Theron</u>, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th Cir.1986). At some point of time, pretrial detention is excessively prolonged and, therefore, punitive rather than regulatory.

The Supreme Court in <u>Salerno</u> provided little guidance on how to determine whether a detainee's due process rights have been violated, stating simply that the trial court's judgment depends on whether the length of detention is excessive in relation to the regulatory goals. Although many courts have interpreted this abstract analytical framework to require an analysis of (1) the duration of custody; (2) the government's or court's responsibility for the delay; and (3) the extent of flight or dangerousness, other courts omit any inquiry about the reason for the delay, and some incorporate additional factors in their analysis such as the seriousness of the charges against the defendant, the strength of the government's case on the merits, the type of threat posed by the defendant, and the extent to which release conditions can minimize risk of flight and potential dangerousness. See generally, <u>United States v. Hare</u>, 873 F.2d 796, 801 (3rd Cir.1989); <u>United States v. Accetturo</u>, <u>supra</u>, 783 F.2d at 388; <u>United States v. Gallo</u>, <u>supra</u>, 750 F.Supp. at 343-345 (court found that due process will not permit the detention of a defendant charged with threatening witnesses to continue beyond eight months despite finding that the pretrial delay was not attributable to any fault of the government); <u>United States v. Theron</u>, 782 F.2d 1510, 1512 (10th Cir.1986)(court finds that "serious constitutional questions" would arise

⁷(...continued)

substantive due process include the Sixth Amendment's provision that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial" and the Eight Amendment's prohibition against excessive bail. Also implicated is the fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. See, e.g., <u>United States v. Gatto</u>, 750 F.Supp. 664, 672 (D.N.J. 1990); <u>United States v. Gallo</u>, 750 F.Supp. 320, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).

unless it construed Speedy Trial Act [18 U.S.C. §§3161-3174] as requiring release or trial within thirty days for defendant, already detained for four months and expected to be detained ten to fourteen months until end of trial, and where the delay was cause by complexity of codefendants' cases and defendant took no steps to cause the delay).

The Ninth Circuit assesses the due process limit on the length of pretrial detention on a case-by-case basis. <u>United States v. Gelfuso</u>, 838 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir.1988); see also <u>United States v. Gonzalez-Claudio</u>, <u>supra</u>, 806 F.2d at 340. The court should consider the length of confinement in conjunction with the extent to which the prosecution bears responsibility for the delay that has ensued. United States v. Gelfuso, supra, 838 F.2d at 359.

B. Length of Delay:

The prolonged pretrial detention in this case violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. SILVA has been incarcerated for almost twelve months for the instant conduct, and five months on these federal charges without a trial date even being set. This case has several defendants and involves lengthy wiretaps. If not released on bail, it is likely he will be incarcerated for at least another year prior to trial. Thus, his continued incarceration is excessively prolonged and punitive.

The pretrial release provision in 18 U.S.C. §3164(c) is helpful in determining what may be a violation of due process. Section 3164(c) provides that

(c) Failure to commence trial of a detainee as specified in subsection (b), through no fault of the accused or his counsel, or failure to commence trial of a designated release as specified in subsection (b), through no fault of the attorney for the Government, shall result in the automatic review by the court of the conditions of release. No detainee, as defined in subsection (a), shall be held in custody pending trial after the expiration of such ninety-day period required for the commencement of his trial. A designated release, as defined in subsection (a), who is found by the court to have intentionally delayed the trial of his case shall be subject to an order of the court modifying his nonfinancial conditions of release under this title to insure that he shall appear at trial as required.

18 U.S.C. §3164(c); see also <u>United States v. Theron</u>, 782 F.2d 1510, 1515 ("reasonable delay" exclusion of §3161(h)(7) has a different meaning and application under §3164 than under §3161). Thus, a defendant who has been detained over ninety-days prior to trial should be released if there have been unreasonable delays which cannot be attributed to the defendant.

C. Responsibility for the Delay:

SILVA's counsel needs time to prepare for trial and pretrial motions. However, he could have been prosecuted on the possession of three ounces of black tar heroin in state court where it was originally charged. The decision to charge SILVA in a multi-defendant conspiracy necessitates considerable pretrial preparation and review of months of wiretaps which do not involve SILVA. This factor weighs in favor of SILVA's release on due process grounds.

D. The Magnitude of the Threat to the Government's Regulatory Interests:

The proper focus in this regard should be on how big the threat would be to the government's regulatory interests should SILVA be released on stringent conditions aimed at reducing as much as possible the likelihood of harm to the community. In this case SILVA can be released upon the most stringent conditions such as home detention with electronic monitoring, drug testing and drug treatment. In light of the fact conditions of release can be fashioned to protect the community if SILVA was released pre-trial, the pretrial detention is unreasonable and a violation of due process.

CONCLUSION

SILVA should be released pretrial on a \$100,000 appearance bond cosigned by his wife and parents. A condition of his pre-trial release should be that he remain under home detention and not leave his wife's residence without permission and advance notice to his pre-trial services officer. Further, SILVA will abide by all other conditions requested by pre-trial services or this Court to insure the safety of the community and his appearance in court.

Dated: April 2, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE C. BOISSEAU

Attorney for Defendant
MICHAEL JOSEPH SILVA